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Abstract. Cybersecurity capacity building has emerged as a notable matter for 
numerous jurisdictions. Cyber-related threats are posing an ever-greater risk to na-
tional security for all countries, irrespective of whether they are developed or in 
the midst of transitioning. This paper presents the results of two qualitative studies 
using the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (CCMM) for nations: (1) Inter-
active Management (IM) and (2) focus groups to analyse the current state of 
Spring Land’s cybersecurity capacity. A total of 26 participants from government 
agencies and five national experts from the Spring Land National Cybersecurity 
Authority (NCSA) contributed to this study. The results show that Spring Land has 
many issues such as lack of cybersecurity culture and collaborative road-map 
across government sectors which results in instability within the country. The as-
sessments feed into the requirement analysis of the National Cybersecurity Capaci-
ty Building Framework that can be utilised to organise and test the cybersecurity 
for nations. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity capacity, Cybersecurity Maturity Models and Interac-
tive Management. 
1. Introduction  
Over numerous decades, there have been several notable security failings that have 
defined the global security environment and resulted in governments being unable to 
preserve domestic security [1]. Maintaining national security (including cybersecurity) 
is the main responsibility of national governments and failing to do so contributes to 
the instability of a country [2]. Countries in a transition  phase is typically characterised 
by civil war; political and economic upheaval; the absence of law [3, 4]. Transition 
phase refers to the intermediate phase in which a previous regime is replaced by a 
modern alternative [5]. There are a number of factors affecting the success or failure of 
transition stage. These factors include: the type of regime prior to the transition stage, 
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the characteristics of the new leader of the transitional government and the influence of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) [6]. 
Many of these countries depend on cyberspace to provide daily services for their 
citizens using information and communication technologies (ICT). The growth of ICT 
technologies and applications provides an important vehicle for communication and 
interaction and has increasingly become common in low-income countries and coun-
tries that are in a transitional stage [7]. Access to a range of ICTs brings new opportuni-
ties for information exchange and communication but it also can also be seen as a tech-
nological and generational challenge to the hierarchical social order of many countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The current experience of de-
mocracy movements (the Arab Spring) in a number of MENA countries demonstrates 
how during times of public protest and turbulence, ICTs can be significant forces for 
organisation and mobilisation [7].  
This paper aims to evaluate the capacity of cybersecurity in countries progressing 
through a phase of transition by taking Spring Land as an exemplar case study. The 
name ‘Spring Land’ has been selected to disguise the real name of the country in which 
the case study has been undertaken.  
The assessment was undertaken by applying the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity 
Model (CCMM) - V1.2, utilising the Interactive Management (IM) approach and focus 
group discussion method. The CCMM model was designed by the Global Cybersecuri-
ty Capacity Centre at the University of Oxford [8]. The CCMM model was nominated 
because it successfully demonstrates the effect that a Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
(CCB) approach can achieve at the worldwide level, including all aspects of cybersecu-
rity to ensure that the platform remains resilient. This assessment has provided a great 
opportunity to illustrate the fact that in the current hyper connected world, states in a 
transitional phase are not operating in isolation and their failure in certain critical areas 
such as cyberspace is likely to have a ripple effect by destabilising stable states. More-
over, it will feed into the requirement analysis of the National Cybersecurity Capacity 
Building Framework and the possibility of organising and testing cybersecurity in these 
countries. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the related empirical re-
search; Section 3 provides an overview on the CCMM; Section 4 presents the selected 
methodology and the problem of space contextualisation through the IM. The cyberse-
curity posture of Spring Land through the focus group discussion is presented in Sec-
tion 5. Finally, Section 6 provides a conclusion and recommendations for future re-
search in this area.  
2.  Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB)   
Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) is one of the greatest challenges that countries 
face, particularly countries in a transitional stage. These challenges are range from 
human resource development, institutional reform, organisational adaption, and the 
support provided to increase their potential to not only make use of the Internet but also 
realise its full potential [9, 10]. The majority of problems relate to the lack of cyberse-
curity culture and an inability to understand the threat posed as well as the probable 
consequences [11].  
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Furthermore, various other issues can affect decisions when building a secure cy-
berspace. For instance, many countries lack a legislative framework, the resources 
required to build what they need and secure capacities in cyberspace. Also, awareness 
of and education about the threats and risks associated with cyberspace are common 
issues in these countries. Without awareness and education, attempts to secure a system 
are rendered inefficient, if not useless [9, 12]. Another problem is linked to the dearth 
of skills among Internet users to protect themselves against rapidly emerging cyber-
threats. In many developing countries and countries in a transitional period, Internet 
users are inexperienced and are not technically savvy.  
The term ‘capacity building’ refers to the process of addressing an identified issue 
with poor governance by ensuring a suitable capability so that core functions are deliv-
ered [11]. Therefore, capacity building entails developing organisational structures (i.e. 
methods of management at the organisational level), human capital (i.e. addressing 
skills shortages and enhancing knowledge), and the frameworks that underpin legal and 
institutional arrangements (i.e. strategies and legislation). 
However, various frameworks and guidelines have been devised by academic re-
searchers as well as organisations operating in the country or worldwide. From these, it 
is apparent that five pillars support cybersecurity capacity: human, organisational, in-
frastructure, technology, law and regulation [13]. Such frameworks are primarily con-
cerned with the risks to cybersecurity and the steps that can be taken to protect against 
them at the international level and especially in advanced economies. In addition, it is 
apparent from the empirical literature that there is a paucity of research focusing on 
emerging market countries owing to their relative shortage of human capital as well as 
technical capacity [14]. National governments and international organisations have 
recognised the threat posed by such risks but efforts to implement effective defences 
have not been coordinated and this disjointed approach has resulted in certain countries 
being much better prepared than others [15]. According to Muller [9], current efforts to 
address CCB have not taken a global perspective or have advocated CCB but failed to 
suggest how it should be implemented.  
3. Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CCMM) 
The CCMM was developed by the Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre at the Uni-
versity of Oxford through collaboration with international stakeholders including the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, the Commonwealth Tele-
communications Organisation (CTO) and the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) [8]. The model offers a comprehensive analysis of cybersecurity capacity 
through five dimensions. These dimensions are cybersecurity strategy, Cybersecurity 
awareness, Cybersecurity education, training and skills, Cybersecurity legal framework 
and the Standards, Organisations and Technologies.  
Each dimension has multiple factors which define what it means to possess a cy-
bersecurity capacity. For each factor, there are five stages of maturity. The Start-up 
indicator describes a non-existent or inadequate level of capacity; the Formative level 
indicates that some features are formulated but poorly defined; the Established pointer 
shows that an element of the sub-factors are in place and defined; in the Strategic indi-
cators level the selections of which parts of indictors are vital or less important have 
been made for particular institutions/nations based on certain conditions; the Dynamic 
indicator level is the highest level and indicates that there are clear mechanisms in 
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place to modify the strategy subject to the prevailing circumstance. The results of the 
maturity levels are graphically represented using a radar chart [8].  
4. Methodology 
The assessment of the national cybersecurity capacity of Spring Land utilises two qual-
itative approaches: Interactive Management (IM) and focus groups discussions using 
the CCMM for Nation states. In this study, in order to gain a more thorough under-
standing of the Spring Land cybersecurity posture in which the model will be applied, 
the authors worked alongside the Spring Land National Cybersecurity Authority 
(NCSA). The NCSA leads the national cybersecurity programme in Spring Land to 
achieve resilience in cyberspace [16]. The following sections provide more details 
about the methodology used in this paper and the participant’s profile. 
4.1. Interactive management 
The IM approach relates to complicated scenarios that demand collaboration among 
numerous knowledgeable individuals to address the matter and suggest a plan of action 
based on mutual agreement instead of a majority vote[17, 18]. There are three phases in 
IM, the first of which is the planning phase where the scenario and scope are specified. 
This involves creating a formal scope and context statement, defining the state of as-
sessment, and verifying the identities of the related actors. During the workshop phase, 
the participants develop a shared understanding of events [17].  
There are three procedures involved in IM workshops: idea writing (IW); nominal 
group technique (NGT); and interpretive structural modelling (ISM) [17, 18]. IW in-
volves the participants being presented with a question so that they can develop their 
thoughts in writing and only then share their ideas. During the NGT, those participating 
assess the matter from a holistic perspective based on what occurred during the IW 
process. A ranking of the various ideas is compiled on the basis of their importance. 
The idea statements are then used as the basis for developing objectives and an Inter-
pretive Structural Model (ISM) so that the way in which the factors associated with the 
problem relate to each other is recognised.  In the follow-up process, the objectives and 
outcomes previously arrived at are acted upon to help bring about a viable solution.  
The authors had selected this method because IM sessions are conducted as part of an 
integrated approach for dealing with the situation, and each session builds on what 
came before and lays the foundation for what will come after [17]. 
In this study, a one-day workshop was hosted by NCSA for a total of 26 partici-
pants representing various stakeholders. The information details of the participants 
involved in the workshop are described in the participant’s profile section. The results 
of this approach were published at the World Conference on Information Systems and 
Technologies (2019) [10]. 
4.2. Focus group 
Focus group discussions aim to explore a  various opinions that people have regarding 
particular matters and emphasising the different thoughts that groups of people have 
[19]. Conducting a focus group entails people collaborating about a particular subject 
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matter to enable the collection of relevant data [20]. Focus groups give people the op-
portunity to interact with each other in a way that yields useful information and a range 
of opinions. The decision was taken to hold focus groups because the authors believed 
it would generate richer data than would otherwise be possible if selecting alternative 
methods. [21]. In this study, five experts from the NCSA were interviewed in one ses-
sion hosted in the capital city of Spring Land.  
4.3.  Participant’s profile 
Two workshops hosted by the NCSA were conducted with a national expert from 
Spring Land. The IM approach was conducted with a total of 26 participants from dif-
ferent stakeholders, 25 males and 1 female only due to lack of gender diversity in-
volved in cybersecurity roles. The ages of those participating were within the range of 
25-55 years and they had been selected because of the contribution they make to deci-
sion-making processes. They were drawn from various areas of expertise including 
banking, management, defence, security, oil production, immigration, digital crime and 
the intelligence service.  
The focus group discussion was conducted with five experts (lead practitioners) 
from the NCSA. The participants (Ps) in this session were chosen based on their roles 
within the NCSA. The participants comprised senior management of the NCSA in 
Spring Land, a director of the NCSA (P1), a deputy director of the NCSA (P2), the 
head of the national cybersecurity incidents response team (CERT) (P3), the head of 
awareness and general relations (P4), and the head of the internal audit office (P5). For 
the purposes of confidentiality, the names of the participants were not disclosed.  
5. Results 
5.1 Problem space contextualisation through Interactive Management 
5.1.1. Ideas writing (IW) results 
An IW was employed to identify matters associated with a particular trigger question, 
thereby enabling those participating to share opinions and brainstorm in a group setting. 
Those participating were assigned to one of three groups where they discussed the 
question and offered opinions relating to the state of Spring Land’s cyber security. The 
selected trigger question sought to identify the cybersecurity capacity issues faced by 
Spring Land. The trigger question employed was: What are the current issues of cyber-
security capacity in Spring Land? 
Once the session had concluded, each of the statements that had been made were 
assigned a number and categorised on the basis of the CCMM dimensions. The ideas 
generated by the groups in response to the question are summarised and Table 1 pre-
sents examples of the challenges of cybersecurity capacity in Spring Land. 
Table 1. Examples of national cybersecurity capacity challenges of countries in transitional stage vs CCMM 
Dimensions[10]  
D1 - Cybersecurity policy and strategy D2 - Cyber culture and society 
D1.1. Absence of a national cybersecurity strategy.   
D1.2. Unavailability of a national risk management 
plan and threat of cyberspace has not been identi-
D2.1. Lack of a cybersecurity culture and the ab-
sence of an understanding of cyber-risk and its 
consequences in the public and private sectors as 
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fied at the national or sector-specific level. 
D1.3. Deficiency of a national roadmap for a cyber 
defence strategy. 
well as among decision-makers. 
D2.2. Lack of awareness-raising programmes at the 
governmental level. 
D2.3. Citizens’ confidence in the use of e-
government services is weak. 
5.1.2.  Nominal group technique (NGT) results.  
The purpose of using the NGT was to produce, simplify and amend ratings for a series 
of objectives. Those participating chose what they believed to be the three main objec-
tives for the various dimensions (where 1 indicates the lowest importance and 3 indi-
cates the greatest importance). 19 of the participants cast their vote but 7 did not be-
cause of external commitments or other reasons. Figure 1 illustrates the objectives of 
greatest importance for the various dimensions as well as indicating how they inter-
relate. 
5.1.3. Interpretive structural modelling (ISM) for countries in transitional stage. 
The ISM approach enabled those participating to analyse how the elements resulting 
from the NGT process are inter-related, providing the means to address the associated 
complexities [22, 23].  So as to ensure that the ISM is clear, the objectives of the NGT 
stage were categorised on the basis of their similarities to help identify the most notable 
objectives of the respective dimensions. Figure 1 illustrates the ISM resulting from the 
objective statements and how they interact on the basis of the CCMM’s dimensions.  
D1.3Establish National 
Cyber Defence strategy 
road map (37)




D1.6 Create a national 
list of Critical National 
Infrastructure (CNI) 
assets (16)







D3.1Develop a national 
cyber security 
education (40)
D3.4 Classify the 
training needs (12) D 3 . 3 Provide a 
sufficient Budget 
capacity building    (39) 
D4.1 Draft national 
laws and regulations 
relating to digital crime 
(40)




D4.3 Build national 
capacity in law 
enforcement of cyber-
related crime (27)











Figure 1. Interpretive structural modelling for countries in a transitional phase 
M.A.B. Naseir et al. / Assessment of National Cybersecurity Capacity for Countries 149
 
It is apparent from Figure 1 that there is a need for a national blueprint owing to 
the fact that the existing state cyberspace interactions make clear the insufficient capac-
ity of national cybersecurity. It can also be seen that the group believed providing a 
comprehensive programme to boost awareness throughout the country would help to 
enhance the capacity of cybersecurity at the national level. It was the group’s belief that 
establishing a national strategy would help to initiate a process that would result in a 
national legal framework to enhance the sharing of information, the disclosure of sus-
ceptibilities and reporting among public sector bodies. Furthermore, it was recom-
mended by the group that international standards (e.g., ISO27000) be adopted by gov-
ernment bodies so as to bolster efforts to ensure effective technical controls. In addition, 
it was claimed that the capacity to tackle threats (both internal and external) would 
benefit from improvements to physical security.   
5.2 Spring Land’s cybersecurity posture through focus group discussion  
This section discusses the results of applying the CCMM model to assess Spring 
Land’s cybersecurity posture using a focus group discussion approach. Five experts 
(lead practitioners) from the NCSA participated in this discussion, as mentioned in the 
participant’s profile section.  The cybersecurity posture of a nation state of the five 
dimensions of the CCMM model is presented in Figure 2 which shows the overall ca-
pacity level results using the radar chart.  
5.2.1. Cybersecurity policy and strategy indicators (D1).  
This dimension explores the capacity of the government to design, create, organise and 
implement the cybersecurity strategy. Through the discussion, this dimension was clas-
sified to be at the start-up stage in Spring Land because no national cybersecurity strat-
egy currently exists. Therefore, NCSA has been assigned to be in charge of the cyber-
security programme. 
 “NCSA leads the security of information as there is no single body or group related to 
cybersecurity in Spring Land. In general, we can say that we are at a strategic level 
with a total lack of financial support because of the political situation” (P1). 
NCSA created a national computer emergency response team (Spring Land - 
CERT) which is working only at the level of NCSA departments due to a lack of co-
operation, trust, national strategy and poor awareness at the state level. 
“In general, we have national accreditation to represent Spring Land in the world but 
there is no national plan and poor communication channels due to the fear of dealing 
with one another. In contrast, there is good cooperation at an international level as 
Spring Land is a member of different international organisations such as ITU” (P3).  
Regarding the critical national infrastructure (CNI) protection, most of the Spring 
Land critical systems have been destroyed and the government has not issued a list of 
CNI.  
“In general, physical security has a negative impact on CNI and there are no clear 
processes to reveal who is in charge of protecting all sectors, except the telecommuni-
cations sector” (P5). 
Furthermore, the difficult economic situation and scarcity of means in the country 
prevents the NCSA from raising awareness and improving national infrastructure pro-
tection.  
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5.2.2. Cyber culture and society indicators (D2) 
Cyber culture and society at both the individual and government level are at the start-
up stage in Spring Land. In the meantime, the NCSA has tried to improve the 
knowledge base and raise awareness of cybersecurity issues through campaigns and 
programmes targeted at children, their parents and university students.  
“NCSA has conducted awareness activities for the government sector. As a result of 
these activities, NCSA reported a lack of awareness programmes in all government 
sectors and society” (P4). 
Additionally, the NCSA has a plan to change the cybersecurity mind-set and raise 
awareness of the Spring Land public and national sector regarding spam, scams, phish-
ing, information security, wireless network security and cloud computing security. The 
NCSA team pointed out that a lack of skilled people and cybersecurity awareness leads 
to more cybersecurity threats and increased cyber vulnerabilities. Despite the fact that 
some e-government services in Spring Land have been developed and implemented, a 
lack of trust and confidence in online security prevails due to there being no online 
protection across the majority of the government sector. 
“Spring Land has been considered as a target for e-hunting; these are hackers 
from inside and outside the state. These hackers are creating fake social media pages 
to commit frauds. There are no public key infrastructures or digital certificates to pro-
tect it” (P5). 
Due to political issues and the absence of a legislative body in Spring Land, the 
maturity of privacy online is considered to be at a start-up stage because no official 
initiatives have been issued. The exception is a certain unofficial initiative to issue laws 
for electronic transactions.  
5.2.3. Cybersecurity education, training and skills indicators (D3) 
Throughout the discussion, it has been noted that cybersecurity education, training, and 
skills capacity in Spring Land is at a start-up level. There are no plans at the national 
level to increase the efficiency of education in the field of cybersecurity.  
“There are no plans at the state level to define the required educational curricula in 
cybersecurity” (P4).  
Additionally, there are no current or future financial allocations, co-ordination or 
training plans between universities and the private sector regarding cybersecurity train-
ing at the state level due to a lack of interest.  
5.2.4. Legal and regulatory framework indicators (D4) 
This dimension looks at the government’s capacity to design and develop national leg-
islation and accompanying by-laws that directly and indirectly relate to cybersecurity. 
In Spring Land, the level of maturity for this dimension is considered to be at the start-
up phase. There is no cyber- or ICT security-related legislation or regulations except 
for some initiatives by the e-Commerce Chamber of the Ministry of Economy. These 
initiatives face many problems, but the crucial problem is jurisdictional fragmentation 
due to political instability. Moreover, there is a digital crime unit in the Ministry of the 
Interior that deals with this type of crime by applying traditional laws relating to ordi-
nary crimes, not cyber-related laws. Spring Land does not have any regulations or laws 
specifically relating to privacy, data protection or human rights. 
“There are no laws related to protect systems and data” NCSA team. 
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Figure 2.  Results of all CCMM dimensions. 
In addition, law enforcement along with the investigation and prosecution of cy-
bercrime services in Spring Land face a shortage of skills to handle cybercrime cases. 
Moreover, there is no national mechanism to report or disclose cyber related crime or 
vulnerabilities. Also, there are no specific courts dealing with digital crime and no 
training is provided to build capacity in this particular dimension. 
5.2.5. Standards, organisations and technology indicators (D5) 
Throughout the discussion, all of the participants agreed that Spring Land is at the start-
up stage in terms of this dimension. There are no cybersecurity standards that have 
been adapted to procurement and software development in the government sector. As 
explained by the NCSA team, there has been an attempt to start the process of imple-
menting international standards but there is a shortage of skilled people and financial 
resources. There is no national agency or framework to monitor the implementation of 
standards and minimal acceptable practices in the government sector.  
In addition, there is a lack of research centres in this field and poor co-operation 
between the public and private sectors in terms of training and the development of 
skills. As mentioned by the participants in the discussion of Dimension 1, not all sec-
tors have a disaster recovery plan or a business continuity plan. All of the participants 
pointed out that the government does not have a plan to manage, monitor or evaluate 
national infrastructure resilience. 
6. Conclusion and future work 
The current paper has examined the core features of Spring Land’s cybersecurity to 
demonstrate the typical situation faced by countries in transition phase and how best to 
address such matters. The observations help to improve our grasp of the capacity of 
cybersecurity in Spring Land and provide a foundation for a National Cybersecurity 
Capacity Framework (NCCBF) in countries that are transitioning stages. The IM ap-
proach yielded a series of problem statements and objectives that can be applied to 
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enhance management processes in similar cases. Be that as it may, it is apparent that 
additional validation is needed for the results obtained and future research should select 
data that will enable the results to be generalised. In addition, future research should 
apply the UML and IDEF0 modelling methods so that the ISM can be decomposed into 
functional models to develop the NCCBF. Using data from advanced countries in 
which the CCMM is already operational in addition to a range of practices and stand-
ards, the framework will make it possible for transitioning countries to overhaul their 
existing cybersecurity arrangements by initiating strategies capable of realising a desir-
able outcome.  
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